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This article investigates the responsiveness of the Parti socialiste towards specific social groups 
under the Hollande and Mitterrand presidencies. It thereby contributes to the discussion on the 
changing representativeness of social-democratic parties in Western Europe. The study is based 
on a content analysis of the governments’ justifications for the annual budget. With this innovative 
approach it is possible to assess whether the responsiveness of a party persists at the governmental 
level. Through an inductive coding procedure, three categories of responsive justifications are 
discerned: inequality reduction, needs of specific social groups and general functioning of society. 
In line with its title, the article mainly focuses on the second category, identifying a shift from 
responsiveness to the low-income classes towards responsiveness to the middle 
classes. Furthermore, a corresponding transformation of the Parti socialiste is observed, from 






In the spring of 2012, the French Parti socialiste won both the presidential and the legislative 
elections (with 51.64% and 49.93% of the votes respectively), and François Hollande became the 
first socialist president since 1995. The electoral victories also gave birth to the first left-wing 
government in the country since a decade. The change in office was saluted with enthusiasm by 
progressively minded political observers, who saw in Hollande and the program of his party the 
right answers to the austerity-dominated context of the time (Clift 2012; Hewlett 2012). Nearing 
the end of his mandate, the question arises to what extent the Hollande governments have actually 
had a leftist partisan character: have they been responsive to particular social groups, or have they 
obscured their political offer, as theorised in recent contributions to the literature about the failures 
of representative democracy (Mair 2014)? In this article, we analyse the responsiveness of the 
Hollande governments and compare it with the responsiveness of the first left-wing governments 
in the French Fifth Republic: the PS-dominated governments during François Mitterrand’s first 
presidential mandate (1981–1986).  
Our study consists of a comparative content analysis of the arguments with which the 
minister in charge justifies the annual budget of the government. This approach allows us to study 
the responsiveness of the governing party at a stage of the democratic process that has been left 
relatively unexplored in the literature on the representativeness of political parties. The important 
innovation brought by this type of analysis is that the policymaker’s partisan statements are 
directly linked to the actual policy that the government pursues. The justifications contained in the 
presentation of the national budget, moreover, are informative of how the executive profiles itself 
in front of a very heterogeneous audience, including party supporters, government opposition and 




responsiveness within the framework of the ‘responsive-responsible dilemma of party-
government’ (Bardi et al 2014), as they allow for exploring how the representativeness of 
governing parties survives the pressures and constraints of policy-making.  
Besides its methodological contributions, the present article also sheds new empirical light 
on the representative character of social democratic parties. Within the vast amount of literature 
that has been written on this topic, recent influential studies show that the composition of social 
democratic electorates has substantially changed over the last few decades (Gingrich and 
Häusermann 2015). In our study we find that this change is also reflected on the other side of the 
policy process, as the PS-led government under the Hollande presidency claimed to be responsive 
to both the low-income classes and (especially) the middle classes, whereas under the Mitterrand 
presidency it claimed to be primarily responsive to the low-income classes. On top of that, we find 
that these different representative claims are accompanied by different budgetary policies. With 
this article we thus contribute in the drawing of a synthesis between what is known on the changing 
social composition of social-democratic electorates and the consequential different policies 
pursued by contemporary social-democratic governments (e.g. Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; 
Huber and Stephens 2015; Gingrich and Ansell 2015). Our method, moreover, could also be 
employed by other scholars and thereby contribute to the study of responsiveness in general. 
The article is structured as follows. We first define the key concept – responsiveness – and 
argue how the study of justifications could potentially enhance our understanding thereof. 
Subsequently, we sketch where the debate in the literature on social democratic parties is at, and 
clarify how our study contributes to these discussions. In Section 3 we provide a description of our 
methodology and categorisation of the justifications, as well as an overview of the data we 




governmental periods and compare how these are distributed across the three sub-categories that 
we identified. After that, we zoom into the justifications referring to the demands of specific social 
groups and develop our argument about the way the responsiveness of the Parti socialiste is 
substantially different today compared to the 1980s. We conclude the article with a discussion of 
and reflection on our findings. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
Analysing responsiveness 
Responsiveness is a concept that is not always defined in the same way. In general, scholars agree 
that it entails the idea that policies reflect citizens’ preferences, but are divided when it comes to 
its operationalisation (see for example Bardi et al. 2014). Consequently, studies on political 
responsiveness differ a great deal from one another, ranging from the measurement of congruence 
between governmental policy positions and ‘public opinion’ (e.g. Ezrow and Hellwig 2014) to 
case studies about the extent to which governing parties follow their electoral mandate (e.g. 
Hofferbert and Budge 1992). These different operationalisations result from different 
understandings of how voters’ preferences should be linked to policy outputs. 
In our study of justifications, we follow Sartori’s (1976) characterisation of responsive 
government and link it to Powell’s (2004) idea of responsiveness as a representative chain. We 
thereby focus on the last stage of this chain, where the governing party provides information to the 
parliament and the public about its actions in office. In this way, we are able to analyse the extent 
to which the governing party still embodies the interests and preferences of its electoral 




supply-side tend to focus primarily on party positions before Election Day (e.g. Kriesi et al 2012), 
our approach allows us to move further in the representative chain and explore how party 
representativeness persists at the policy-making stage, where it is often constrained by a variety of 
factors, such as socio-economic challenges or institutional constraints (Schmidt 1996). 
Besides differing from the analyses of parties’ programmatic offer, our analysis is also 
substantially distinct from studies focusing on governmental discourse, such as the Comparative 
Agendas Project (CAP), wherein agenda setting and issue prioritisation play a key role (e.g. Green-
Pedersen and Walgrave 2014; Jennings et al 2011). Instead of analysing the differences and 
similarities of issue prioritisation between governmental discourse and party agendas, we direct 
our analysis to the persistence of representative characteristics within the segments of 
governmental discourse that are directly linked to policy. In our view, this persistence constitutes 
a qualitatively more significant indicator of responsiveness. We will come back on the 
methodological aspects of this focus in Section 3. 
Following the idea of responsiveness as a representative chain, our analysis also establishes 
a closer link between studies on political representation and policy studies. As mentioned before, 
the former have a tendency to focus on pre-electoral discourses, such as electoral manifestos (e.g. 
Gabel and Huber 2000) or statements reported in newspapers during the campaign (Kriesi et al 
2008). Policy studies, in turn, focus on the outputs of governments, and party-scholars often try to 
relate these to the partisan composition of the executive. In the literature on the welfare state, for 
instance, there is a long-established tradition of trying to link to partisan composition of 
government to policy outputs (Starke 2006). Yet, the assessments of the extent to which political 
representation affects these policies is generally guided by different understandings of which 




Korpi and Palme 2003). In order to improve our understanding of responsiveness, we therefore try 
to find out which aspects of the budgetary policy are justified with representative claims by the 
policymaker.  
 
The French Parti socialiste and the responsiveness of social democratic parties 
By looking at the responsiveness of the Parti socialiste, we also engage in the difficult task of 
contributing to an issue that has already been studied in a large body of research, namely the 
changing responsiveness of social democratic parties in Europe (e.g. Kitschelt 1994; Przeworski 
and Sprague 1986; Scharpf 1991). In recent investigations it has been convincingly demonstrated 
that the sociological composition of their electorates has undergone significant changes since the 
1980s, as the votes deriving from the (lower skilled) working class have increasingly been replaced 
by support stemming from the expanding middle classes (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015; 
McCrone and Keating 2015). In parallel, social democratic parties across Europe appear to have 
changed their approach with regards to welfare state policies, substituting policies of income 
replacement with social investment (Gingrich and Ansell 2015; Huber and Stephens 2015; Lister 
2003). These policies, in turn, have also been strongly endorsed by the EU’s social agenda (Caune 
et al 2011). With our study we try to establish a closer connection between the ideological change 
of social-democratic parties and the policies pursued by social-democratic governments. 
The French Parti socialiste is a particularly interesting case because it has adhered to the 
electoral changes mentioned above. It has in fact lost support from working-class voters, while 
attracting more and more voters from the expanding middle classes (Tiberj 2013: 87; Joffré 2013: 





[Insert Table 1] 
 
In line with these changes, the influential PS-related think-tank Terra Nova strongly encouraged 
the party to increase its efforts in appealing to middle-class voters during the build-up to the 2012 
presidential elections (Terra Nova 2011: 60 and 61), not in the last place because large parts of the 
French working classes would be increasingly attracted to the cultural and economic protectionism 
of Marine Le Pen’s Front National (Ibid.: 15, 54-55).  
Just as many other social-democratic parties in Western Europe, the PS thus faced the 
challenge of meeting the preferences of a socio-demographically changing clientele (Häusermann 
2015, see also Przeworski and Sprague 1986). The extent to which it has succeeded to do so is 
relatively disputable. As mentioned above, several authors claim, for instance, that the changing 
social-democratic policy supply constitutes a successful case of realignment between parties and 
the changing preferences of voters (e.g. Kitschelt and Rehm 2015). Other scholars, by contrast, 
emphasise that social-democratic parties have rather obscured their programmatic offer and 
distanced themselves from their electorates, due to both the socio-demographic changes and the 
policy-constraints brought by globalisation and European integration (Lacewell 2013; Mair 2014). 
The obscuring of the political supply, in turn, could be brought in relation with a more general 
pattern in European democracies indicating that low-income groups tend to be increasingly under-
represented (Peter and Ensink 2015). It can also be linked to the professionalisation of party 
politicians (e.g., Fiers and Secker 2007) and the increasing social distance between politicians on 




Moreover, the case of the Parti socialiste is particularly interesting because French 
governments have been struggling to meet the EU’s social policy objectives of more employment-
friendly welfare states and more flexible labour markets (Bonoli and Emmenegger 2010: 831; 
European Commission 2016). In the European context, moreover, the Parti socialiste has often 
been considered as a borderline case between the northern and southern social-democrats, in the 
sense that it followed a more pragmatic approach in terms of ideology, whereas it maintained 
organisational features that are typical for the southern European Left (Merkel 1992: 166). It is 
therefore interesting to see how the PS succeeded in translating its ideological transformation at 
the policy-making level under the Hollande presidency, despite the external pressures and 
constraints that are related to the responsibilities of governing. In this article we therefore explore 
the share of representative claims in governments’ justificatory discourses. 
 
3. The analysis of justification arguments 
Discourse is a relatively risky unit of analysis for trying to understand how policies are driven by 
political preferences. There is no guarantee, for instance, that policymakers, when speaking, 
express their actual policy attitudes. Speeches given by politicians may in fact be more 
characterised by rhetorical exercises rather than actual policy criteria (Charteris-Black 2011). With 
our analysis, however, we reduce these risks in two ways. First, and similar to the CAP studies, 
we focus on legislative discourse, wherein policy makers are expected to behave consistently with 
their statements (Van der Veen 2011: 31). Second, and following this logic, we focus on discourse 
that provides an explanation for the origins, criteria and objectives of policies. In other words, we 
do not focus on a whole body of text, but select those passages that are closely linked to actual 




the role of political representation in public office. While the CAP studies have a more quantitative 
accent, our analysis puts more emphasis on the qualitative selection of the data. 
The annual presentations of the government’s budget, moreover, are particularly relevant 
for both their content and their setting. Budgetary policies, in fact, are not an isolated policy area 
but are rather connected to all socio-economic spheres of government activity, and consequently 
have important repercussions for a wide range of actors, including pensioners and international 
financial markets.  As these speeches are given in front of the whole parliament, they expose the 
minister to criticism from both the party supporters as well as the government’s opposition. The 
fact that these speeches are an annual formal recurrence, moreover, enables us to keep many factors 
constant, thereby facilitating a comparison of the responsiveness of the Parti socialiste in the two 
periods under study.  
The presentations of the budget are held each year in the month of October by the minister 
of economy and finance, during the discussion of the general finance law in the French Assemblée 
Générale. We analysed all budget speeches of PS-dominated governments during the first mandate 
of François Mitterrand and that of François Hollande:1 
Mitterrand governments: Laurent Fabius (27 October 1981 and 26 October 1982), 
Jacques Delors (19 October 1983), Pierre Bérégovoy (16 October 1984 and 16 
October 1985). 
                                                          
1 All budget speeches can be found on the official website of the French Assembly. See: http://archives.assemblee-
nationale.fr/7/cri/ for the Mitterrand governments, and http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/debats/ for the 




Hollande governments: Pierre Moscovici (16 October 2012 and 15 October 2013), 
Michel Sapin (14 October 2014, 13 October 2015, 18 October 2016). 
It is important to note that in all cases the minister delivering the speech was a member of the Parti 
socialiste. Following our understanding of responsiveness as a representative chain, the 
justifications of the PS minister should thus reflect the partisan discourse. 
To gather the justifications from the speeches of the minister, we first identified those 
passages referring to a specific policy or to the general government’s action, and then coded the 
phrases that described the criteria, the origins and the reasons behind the government’s budget 
policies. For instance, from the following passage, we coded that the reduction of income taxes 
contained in the last budget of the Hollande presidency is driven by the government’s wish to 
improve the living conditions of the poorest and the middle classes and contribute to the 
progressiveness of the overall tax regime. 
Ce budget mettra en œuvre plusieurs 
mesures qui poursuivront notre action en 
faveur du pouvoir d’achat des plus 
démunis et des classes moyennes. Une 
quatrième baisse consécutive de l’impôt 
sur le revenu est inscrite dans ce projet de 
loi de finances […] Ces mesures ont 
clairement renforcé la progressivité de 
l’impôt sur le revenu 
This budget will exert several measures 
in line with our procedures in favour of 
the spending power of the poorest and 
the middle classes. A fourth consecutive 
reduction of income taxes is part of this 
budget plan […] These measures have 
clearly contributed to the 





Michel Sapin, 18 October 2016 
More specifically, the underlined segment of the text concerns the policy that is being 
referred to and the pieces of text in bold constitute the actual justification-propositions that 
constitute the heart of our analysis. In total, we collected 940 of these propositions (464 for the 
Mitterrand period, 476 for the Hollande period).  
Due to the broadness of the audience, the policies are not only justified according to 
responsive criteria, but also to what might be called responsible criteria (Sartori 1976; Mair 2014; 
Karremans 2016). That is, the technical duties of the government with regards to the economy and 
public finances. These responsible justifications are beyond the scope of this article and will be 
analysed in a future study (Karremans and Damhuis forthcoming). Our focus here is centred on 
the responsive justifications of the PS. 
In Section 4, we will explain how these justifications coincide with the government’s social 
concerns and specific policy goals. At the same time, we also kept track of the type of measures, 
that is, the policy instruments that the latter refer to. More specifically, we made a distinction 
between policy instruments that concretely expanded the governmental activities (such as 
increases in expenditure and higher levels of taxation) from those that restrict the latter (such as 
budgetary cuts and tax relief for certain social groups). We labelled these categories respectively 
as ‘expansive’ and ‘restrictive’ policy instruments. Finally, we also encountered references to 
policy instruments without concrete financial measures. In this case, we classified the references 
as ‘general’ policy. The aim of this second layer of our analysis is to get a better understanding of 
what the responsiveness towards particular social groups actually entails. Section 5 will be devoted 





4. A dilution of ideologically distinctive responsiveness  
In contrast to responsible justifications, responsive arguments justify the government’s policy 
according to its ideological character. To our understanding, the responsiveness of a leftist 
government is characterised by the special attention it displays for social matters, such as the 
reduction of inequality or the investment in public services. It is through this kind of issues that 
social democratic parties generally distinguish themselves from the political right (see also Bobbio 
1996; Kriesi et al 2008; Huber and Stephens 2015). Consequently, the responsiveness of the PS is 
determined by the way in which its ministers in government address these issues. For instance, 
when the minister claims that his budget is just because it provides support to the poorest members 
of society, we consider those justifications to be characteristically leftist and thereby responsive.  
For the Hollande governments, these claims constitute 29% of all justifications, whereas 
for the Mitterrand governments their share is 35%. This difference suggests that the PS-led 
governments were slightly more attentive to social issues during the Mitterrand presidency. When 
looking more closely at the justifications, we will see, however, that this difference is not only 
numerical. More importantly, the PS under the presidency of François Hollande also had different 
social concerns that seem to indicate a more distant attitude towards society, wherein no distinction 
is drawn between different social categories.  
 
Fewer references to inequality reduction 
To analyse the responsive justifications, we subdivided them into three broad groups. This 




(see also Appendix 1). The differentiation however also speaks to more deductively constructed 
theories about modes of representation (e.g. Saward 2008), as they differ in the extent to which 
they refer to the material interests of social groups versus ideas about what government should do 
for society. The three broad categories are: (1) reduction of inequality, (2) needs of specific social 
groups, and (3) general functioning of society.2 The categories differ concerning the way in which 
the government profiles itself as an intervening redistributive actor. Category 1 contains typical 
socialist claims about redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor. Category 2 refers to the 
demands of specific social groups for which the government decides to be responsive. Category 3, 
in turn, contains those claims that depict society as a singular entity and justify the government’s 
action contributing to its general functioning. 
Figure 1 illustrates the share that each category has in the responsive justifications of the 
Hollande and Mitterrand presidencies.  
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
As can be seen, the governments differ significantly in the weight they give to categories one and 
three. This difference, in turn, signals a different perception of the PS about how it should deal 
with societal matters as a governmental actor. 
                                                          
2 Among these 940 justifications, 7 propositions belong to a residual category which might be described as 





The category ‘reduction of inequality’ contains those justifications referring to the 
traditional social democratic commitment of redistributing wealth across society, and are generally 
associated with policies in which the richer segments of society get taxed and the government’s 
plans to extend social provisions for the less well-off. Historically, this type of claims constitutes 
an important component of the political identity of the Parti socialiste, and has been challenged 
during the last few decades by the rise of so-called “neoliberal” ideas in international economic 
debates. Nonetheless, this type of justifications is present in the discourse of both governments, as 
the following examples illustrate:   
 
Est-il acceptable, mesdames, 
messieurs, que 5 p . 100 des Français 
détiennent à eux seuls près de 40 p. 100 
du patrimoine de notre pays alors que 
les 50 p. 100 les moins riches de nos 
concitoyens n'en possèdent que 
quelques pour cent ? L'ambition du 
Gouvernement est de corriger ces 
disparités excessives, ou en tout cas 
d'éviter qu'elles n'augmentent encore. 
  
Is it acceptable, ladies and gentlemen, 
that 5 per cent of the French population 
owns almost 40 percent of the wealth of 
our country whereas the poorest 50 per 
cent of our fellow citizens only 
possesses a few per cent? The ambition 
of the government is to correct these 
excessive disparities, or in any case, to 
prevent them from growing any further  
 





En supprimant plusieurs niches 
fiscales, nous rendons l’impôt plus 
juste et notre système plus 
redistributif.  
  
By closing off several tax loopholes, we 
make taxation fairer and our system 
more redistributive.   
 
Pierre Moscovici, 15 October 2013 
 
From these passages we can see how governments in the two periods under study integrate 
justifications on inequality reduction. As can be observed in Figure 1, however, the relative share 
of these justifications has been remarkably inferior under the Hollande presidency. This difference 
persists also when we take the so-called tournant de la rigeur into consideration during the 
Mitterrand presidency, as these justifications also represented roughly 30% of the responsive 
justifications in the budget speeches between 1983 and 1985. In the Hollande period, by contrast, 
these justifications were mainly present in the first budget speech and tended to disappear in the 
central part of the term in office, and reappear only in the last budget speech. 
 
More references to the general functioning of society 
The trend is almost opposite when looking at the justifications referring to the third broad category, 
namely the general functioning of society. These claims do not make any distinction between 
social groups, and are generally used to justify investments in education and other sorts of public 




power of all citizens (irrespective of social positions) a certain extent, these claims are also less 
ideologically distinctive than the other responsive justifications, as the next excerpts exemplify: 
 
L'effort de formation et de recherche sera 
lui aussi intensifié. Le budget prévoit, à cet 
égard, un accroissement important des 
moyens affectés à ces actions.  
The effort put into education and 
research will also be intensified. In this 
respect, the budget contains an important 
increase in the means assigned to these 
actions.  
 
Pierre Bérégovoy, 16 October 1984 
 
[La croissance] passera aussi par 
l’amélioration de la situation économique 
et sociale des Français. En vérité, il s’agit 
là de deux objectifs qui se renforcent 
mutuellement. N’opposons pas ménages et 
entreprises.  
 
[Growth] will also be achieved through the 
improvement of the economic and social 
situation of the French. In truth, these are 
two mutually reinforcing objectives. Let’s 
not oppose households and businesses.  
Pierre Moscovici, 15 October 2013 
 
The category ‘general functioning of society’ thus contains a wide share of justifications which 




improvement rather than emphasising policies aimed at particular social groups. Another 
characteristic of these claims is the emphasis on the need for social unity, as Pierre Moscovici’s 
proposal illustrated, wherein he justifies the government’s action as an effort to ‘not oppose 
households and businesses’.  
When comparing the responsiveness of the two presidential time periods, the justifications 
of the Hollande government tend to be more characterised by this type of claims (40 versus 32%). 
Besides this quantitative shift, it is interesting to notice that justifications belonging to our third 
category are also becoming more and more general in qualitative terms. Under the Mitterrand 
presidency, in fact, the emphasis was put much more on spending commitments towards education 
and culture. Under the Hollande presidency, instead, the justifications put more emphasis on the 
spending power of French citizens in general, thereby emphasising how the government is 
committed not to oppose social groups.  
These developments, and in particular the emphasis on the wish not to oppose social groups, 
are strongly related to the different social groups that are addressed by the PS under the two 
presidencies and the policy instruments it invoked. In the next section we will show how. 
 
5. Changing policy clienteles, changing policy instruments 
Whereas the two periods under study feature significant differences when it comes to the 
proportions of justifications relating to the reduction of inequality and the general functioning of 
society, the relative share of our second category (needs of social groups) stays rather stable over 
time (around 33%). Yet, the Hollande governments did not address the same social groups as the 




groups differ substantially. This corroborates the idea that the PS has adapted its policy supply to 
the different sociological composition of the PS constituencies between the two time periods 
(Häusermann 2015; Huber and Stephens 2015). In this section, we will show that the contemporary 
PS, besides being more concerned with the demands of the middle classes, also tries to meet such 
demands with radically different policy instruments.  
 
From the low-income classes to the middle classes 
Both Hollande and Mitterrand governments dedicate about a third of their responsiveness 
justifications to the needs of particular social groups. Yet they vary when it comes to the extent to 
which they profile themselves as advocates of the demands of different social groups. Figure 2 
reports the relative proportions of these groups within our second category of responsive 
justifications. 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Three remarkable changes meet the eye. First, employees – a traditional electoral clientele of the 
Left (Boy and Mayer 1997) – are considerably less referred to in the contemporary justifications, 
with percentages dropping from about 15 to 2 when comparing the Mitterrand with the Hollande 
governments. Second, a similar pattern can be observed for the unemployed, whereby the 
percentages decrease from about 15 to 4. The third and most staggering change concerns the 




appearance of the middle classes in the PS budget speeches. From a complete absence in the 1980s, 
middle classes (including explicit references to middle income groups) nowadays constitute the 
main social group to which the PS claims to be responsive. 
The increased attention to the middle classes, moreover, is strongly paired up with the 
above-mentioned claims not to oppose different social groups, as the following passage of minister 
Michel Sapin illustrates: 
  
Nous n’opposons pas les catégories 
sociales entre elles, nous n’avons pas deux 
politiques en fonction des uns et des autres. 
Nous avons un principe et un seul : l’impôt 
doit baisser et en priorité pour le cœur des 
classes moyennes 
  
We do not oppose social categories; we 
do not have two policies according to one 
group or another. We only have one single 
principle: taxation must be reduced, first 
and foremost for the heart of the middle 
classes  
Michel Sapin, 13 October 2015 
 
This tendency of de-conflictualisation is indicative of the pattern we described before: the 
quantitative and qualitative shift towards a fading of the party’s ideological distinctiveness and 
increased preoccupation with the general functioning of society. The shift towards meeting the 




Whereas the PS showed an increasing attention towards the middle classes during the Hollande 
period, the party seemed to be more determined in profiling itself as a proactive advocate of the 
poorest parts of the population during the Mitterrand years, as the following passage also illustrates. 
 
Bien entendu, l’État ne peut pas réduire […] 
les impôts de ceux qui ne paient pas d’impôt à 
l’État. C'est aussi simple que cela. Cela veut-
il dire que rien n’est fait pour les plus 
modestes? Au contraire, depuis 1981, leur 
situation s’est améliorée — on nous l’a assez 
reproché ! 
 
Of course, the state cannot reduce […] the 
taxes of those who do not pay any taxes to 
the state. It’s as simple as that. But is this 
to say that we did not do anything for the 
poorest? Quite the contrary, since 1981, 
their situation has improved – we have 
been criticised sufficiently for it! 
Pierre Bérégovoy, 16 October 1984 
 
With this statement the minister justifies the general policy of the government. It is interesting to 
note that this passage is from 1984. That is, after the famous tournant de la rigueur, when the 
government saw itself forced to reverse its expansive policies (Gourevitch 1986). With this and 
similar statements, the government still claims to be responsive towards the lower social classes. 
The references towards the social groups remain relatively constant throughout the term in 
offices of both presidencies. Also after 1983, the PS ministers emphasised their commitment to 




started to pursue (Ross 1987; Christofferson 1991). Under Hollande, the PS profiled itself as a 
caretaker of both the lower and the middle classes in all five years of government. What changed, 
moreover, is the way in which the justifications are associated with the actual policies during the 
two time periods, as will be shown below.  
 
From expansive to restrictive policies 
Both Mitterrand and Hollande governments faced adverse economic conditions that limited the 
extent to which they could increase social spending (Gourevitch 1986; Schäfer and Streeck 2013). 
Surprisingly, however, the share of responsive justifications decreases only marginally in the 
second half of the term in office. In both cases, the PS continued to refer to its partisan 
commitments even when it could not pursue social expenditure policies. The difference between 
the two presidencies, however, is that the PS’s responsive justifications during the Mitterrand 
period hardly ever refer to restrictive measures and, after 1983 they mainly relate to the 
government’s general policy, as the previous passage from the 1984 budget speech illustrated. 
During almost the entire Hollande presidency, however, a large share of the responsive 
justifications refers to budgetary cuts and reduction in taxation. Table 2 illustrates the annual 
distribution of the responsive justifications across the different policy types. 
 





In both cases, the responsive justifications referring to expansive policies tend to disappear towards 
the end of the term in office, which signals how difficult it was in both cases to increase public 
expenditure. For the Mitterrand governments, however, the restrictive measures the government 
was forced to pursue were not justified with responsive justifications. In this period, the latter only 
referred to policy-packages. Under Hollande, by contrast, the responsive claims also largely 
justified the restrictive measures. Together with the scarcer attention given to the reduction of 
inequality and the interests of the lower social classes, these findings shed a new light on the 
changing responsiveness of the PS.  
First of all, the larger share of responsive justifications referring to restrictive measures 
signals that the PS perceives budgetary cuts and reduction in taxation as responsive to the 
preferences of (parts of) its electorate. This seems to be in line with the idea that social-democratic 
parties have adapted their policy supply to the preferences of the middle class, who – despite 
favouring a certain level of redistribution – also support decreases in taxation and a responsible 
way of dealing with public expenditures (Huber and Stephens 2015; Kitschelt and Rehm 2015). 
This interpretation seems to find even stronger confirmation when zooming into the justifications 
referring to the needs of specific social groups. Table 3 illustrates the same pattern as Table 2, but 
focussing only on the justifications referring the second category of our responsive justifications. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
As can be seen, the pattern here is even stronger. The distribution shown in the table strongly 




to redistribute public resources in favour of the poor. In the 2010s instead, the restrictive measures 
that were pursued throughout the whole term in office were still justified with responsive 
arguments that largely referred to the interests of the middle classes.  
Second, besides the stronger focus on the middle classes, it also seems that in the 2010s 
the PS is more willing and more capable in moving within the restricted space it can manoeuvre. 
The following passage, for example, exemplifies how the cost savings it succeeded in achieving 
are subsequently transformed at the advanced of both middle- and low-income households. 
 
J’insisterai maintenant sur l’importance des 
économies, car c’est grâce à elles que nous 
pouvons financer les baisses de prélèvements,  
en particulier la réforme du bas du barème de 
l’impôt sur le revenu qui vous est proposée. 
C’est grâce à ces économies que nous pouvons 
redonner 3,2 milliards d’euros aux ménages 
moyens et modestes. 
 
I will now insist on the importance of the 
cost savings, because it is thanks to them 
that we can finance the decrease of taxes, 
in particular the reform of the income tax 
brackets that is proposed to you. Thanks to 
these cost savings, we can give back 3.2 
billion euros to the middle-income and 
low-income households.  
Michel Sapin, 14 October 2014 
 
This and similar passages corroborate the idea that the PS has shifted its policy supply to the 




profile the government as somehow favouring redistribution, but still within the limits posed by 
responsible criteria of public expenditure policy. At the same time, however, these justifications 
may also suggest that there is less room for distributive policies within the governmental sphere, 
thereby confirming the more pessimistic views about the future of the political left and party-
democracy in general (Mair 2014). 
 
6. Conclusions and perspectives 
In this article we have shown that the PS governments of the Hollande presidency have aimed to 
be more responsive to the middle classes when compared to the governments of the first Mitterrand 
presidency. This finding is in line with recent studies on the changing electoral composition of 
social-democratic parties in Europe, according to which the working class is no longer their core 
clientele (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). The social-democratic electorate has become 
sociologically more variegated, maintaining, however, a preference for a government that works 
towards a reduction of economic inequalities and more social cohesion (Huber and Stephens 2015). 
Our findings confirm these recent insights, highlighting however also some relevant changes in 
the policy-attitude of the PS.  
The content of the justifications not only reveal a change in the social addressees of the PS, 
but also in a different self-profiling when referring to society and social groups. While in the 1980s 
the PS presented itself very clearly as an advocate of the interests of the lower social classes, the 
party profiles itself more as a caretaker of society in general today, wishing not to oppose social 
groups. This change goes hand in hand with the shift of attention towards the middle classes, and 




On top of that, these patterns also seem to be related to a different approach of the party towards 
budgetary cuts and decreases in taxation. Whereas the responsiveness of the PS seemed to be much 
more dependent on its capacity to spend in the 1980s, the party appears to be much more aware 
today of the constraints that a government may face in the field of social expenditure. Consequently, 
it seems to be more cautious in its partisan claims and tries to meet the preferences of its 
constituencies within the limits posed by the economic and financial constraints. This different 
attitude, in turn, is likely to be facilitated by the preferences of the new middle classes, who are 
unlikely to see a government that irresponsibly increases public expenditure (Huber and Stephens 
2015). In many ways, thus, our findings corroborate the idea that the PS has successfully adapted 
its policy supply to the changing preferences of its electorate. 
At the same time, our findings do leave room for further discussion about the idea that 
governing today has become more difficult and that, consequently, the options of being politically 
responsive have become more limited (Mair 2014). To some extent, our findings also signal that 
the responsiveness of the contemporary PS has become less ideological and more pragmatic. This 
could be interpreted as an obscuration of its political supply (Mouffe 2005; Gusenbauer and 
Skrzypek 2013; Lacewell 2013). The restrictive measures with which it tries to meet the demands 
of its electorate, moreover, might entail the risk of alienating the less well-off sections of the of 
the party’s electorate. In turn, this trend taps into what in recent contributions have labelled 
‘differential responsiveness’. That is, the under-representation of the low-income groups in 
European democracies (Peters and Ensink 2015). To further test these ideas, our methodology 
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APPENDIX: CODED JUSTIFICATIONS PER YEAR AND TYPE OF POLICY* 
 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Justification category E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R 
1.1. Reduce inequality  14 6   2 2   3 7   2 11 1 1 8   2 14 3 1 5   1             2 3 
2.1 low-income classes 1     3   1   3 2 2 3       1 1 3     1 2   1 2     1   2 2 
2.2 middle classes                                  1     1 1     2   1 6   2 2 
2.3 unemployed 1                 1 1   1 3         1                 1     
2.4 Employees 1 1 1 1         2   1                               1       
2.5 Families 1     1     2   1 1           1       1             1       
2.6 Young citizens 1             2   1 1         1     1     1     1           
2.7 Elderly 1         1       2                     1           1     3 
2.8 General needs of social groups (other)                                 1                           
2.9 Future generations (other)                                   1                         
2.10 Handicapped adults (other)                   1                                         
2.11 Welfare recipients (other)               1                                             
2.12 Small business owners and shopkeepers (other)       1                                                     
2.13 Farmers (other) 1                         1                                 
2.14 People who started working at young age (other)                               1                             
2.15 People living in tense neighbourhoods (other)                               1                             
2.16 Car users (other) 1                                                           
3.1 General social harmony    2           2           7     2 1   1               3 1   
3.2 Income/spending power    1   1           1 2 1   1     2 4   5       3     2   1 1 
3.3 Life conditions                                    1                         
3.4 Public administration and public services 1 1               1           1               1       1 1   
3.5 Environment protection                                 1   1             1         
3.6 Health 1                 1                                         
3.7 Security 1 1               1       2               1     2     1     
3.8 Education (incl. research) 1       2   1     4       3                     1     1     
3.9 Formation/extra training               2     1     1               1     1           
3.10 Culture 1                                                 1         
3.11 Fight against financial speculation    1                           1 1                           
3.12 Fight against austerity   5                           1 5                           
3.13 Fight against fraud         2                             1           3         
International solidarity (residual category) 1             2                 1               2 1         
Non-responsive justifications 51 37 92 60 61 118 79 73 44 22 
TOTAL    98 54 122 100 90 169 102 86 70 49 
 




Table 1 – Sociological evolution of votes for Mitterrand in 1981 and Hollande in 2012 











2nd round 1981 
Hollande 
2nd round 2012 
Difference 
Self-employed (shopkeeper, artisan) 36 30 -6 
Manager, professional 43 52 +9 
Intermediate occupation 53 50 -3 
Non-manual worker 67 57 -10 
Manual worker 74 58 -16 




























1981 58.7 39.1 2.2 
1982 52.9 35.3 11.8 
1983 21.4 60.7 17.9 
1984 45.0 50.0 5.0 
1985 6.9 89.7 3.4 
 
2012 20,0 60.0 20.0 
2013 17.4 65.2 17.4 
2014 30.8 7.7 61.5 
2015 21.7 26.1 52.2 




Table 3 – Evolution of responsive justifications towards social groups according to type of 





























1981 80.0 10.0 10.0 
1982 75.0 0.0 25.0 
1983 15.4 46.2 38.5 
1984 57.1 42.9 0.0 









2013 22.2 33.3 44.4 
2014 16.7 16.7 66.7 
2015 8.3 8.3 83.3 

















































Figure 2. Distribution of responsive justifications towards social groups under Mitterrand 
and Hollande governments 
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